Information time bombs: Foreign actors flying local colours – Opinion

What caught your attention when the Singapore Government announced on Oct 22 that it was blocking 10 websites linked to foreign actors?

At first glance, the sites seemed unrelated – each with its own domain, design, and a mix of everyday content. But after looking through the Government’s statement and The Straits Times’ reportage, some patterns quickly became clear.

For example, despite their efforts to appear distinct, seven of the sites were likely part of the same network – seemingly connected by the same invisible hand.

These seven portals shared content from the same newswire and dressed it up with a local spin.

All 10 websites tried to pass off as Singaporean, with names like zaobaodaily.com mimicking the Republic’s largest Chinese-language paper, or Alamak.io, with a popular Singlish term as its domain name to make it seem it was run by locals. Most articles also did not have bylines.

Then there was the glaring similarity that the authorities didn’t spell out but was impossible to ignore: These sites had clear allegiances.

Alamak.io, for instance, ran five commentaries by Russian Ambassador Nikolay Kudashev – subsequently shared on the social media accounts of Moscow’s Singapore and Asean embassies – making its alignment with Russia evident.

The other nine, through the nature of their curated content and pro-Beijing messages subtly tucked into otherwise-harmless stories, suggested Chinese involvement.

It is understandable why the Government didn’t directly name China or Russia, leaving the rest of us – citizens, media, academics and civil society – to draw our conclusions from the clues provided. This approach is nothing new in Singapore.

Since foreign interference became more discernible in the 2010s, the Government has consistently avoided naming the states involved, even when it was clear who they were.

Consider the parliamentary debate over the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (Fica) in October 2021. Law and Home Affairs Minister K. Shanmugam explained why Singapore avoids calling out state actors publicly.

The geopolitical costs of directly confronting major powers over hostile information campaigns are simply too high.

Mr Shanmugam cited the case of Huang Jing, a prominent academic whose permanent residency was revoked for working with a foreign government to influence Singapore’s foreign policy and public opinion.

Singapore authorities never named the country he was working for, but the consensus view of the commentariat is that the foreign actor in question was China.

“When we asked Huang Jing to leave, we didn’t say who he was acting for. Why?” Mr Shanmugam said. “The foreign policy and national security implications are too serious. The US can name any country it wishes. But we are a price-taker in this business of international relations.”

This explains why the Singapore Government did not outrightly name the actors behind other instances of foreign interference, such as the 2018 SingHealth cyberattack in which the medical information of 1.5 million patients – including that of then Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong – was stolen.

While the situation with the blocked websites is different – this time, the action was pre-emptive – the reasoning behind not naming names remains the same.

Still, it is crucial that those outside the Government help signal to the public who the likely foreign actors are. This way, people can better navigate the information landscape and discern the agendas that certain sources are pushing.

Threat of inauthentic websites

Beyond identifying who is likely behind those websites, it is equally important for Singaporeans to understand the way they operate.

Researchers Benjamin Ang and Dymples Leong from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), in a commentary published after the Government’s announcement, highlighted how insidious the websites are.

On the surface, they seem to feature non-controversial news about lifestyle and entertainment.

This approach gives them cover, so when foreign actors eventually use those platforms to push disinformation or content aligned with their interests, the websites already appear credible.

As the researchers put it: “The casual presence of non-controversial news gives them the cover that they need – the appearance of authenticity or credibility.”

Another risk is how the websites often recycle the same news stories, especially from wire services, which can mislead “the unwary” into thinking the information is factual or corroborated.

This repetition creates what’s known as the illusory truth effect, where “repeated exposure to the same information increases its likelihood of being perceived as true, even when it is not”, Mr Ang and Ms Leong pointed out.

While the 10 websites had not yet mounted hostile information campaigns, and the authorities say investigations showed Singaporeans are not behind them, their mere existence poses a national security threat, as they could be activated at any time to influence local public opinion with propaganda.

As the RSIS researchers noted, “such networks and sites are like stores of digital ammunition that can be used when the time is right”.

With a general election to be held in the next 12 months, it was all the more important that pre-emptive action was taken.

Information literacy as first defence

In this new Cold War we find ourselves in – where the US and its allies face off against Russia, China, and countries like Iran and North Korea – hostile information campaigns are not just occasional; they’re a permanent fixture in our media landscape.

Regulatory actions under Fica or the recent website blocking under the Broadcasting Act are just one piece of the puzzle. As experts point out, what’s even more crucial is sharpening Singaporeans’ information literacy.

The real challenge lies in recognising how disinformation spreads. The hope is that this latest episode – and the conversations it has sparked – will open more eyes to how easily seemingly harmless websites can become tools for information laundering.

This strategy operates on a spectrum.

At the lowest level, it starts with anonymous, low-grade websites – like the 10 recently blocked – no different from fake accounts on platforms like Facebook, Instagram or X, masquerading as journalists or activists.

Then you have influencers – people who mix everyday content with disinformation, slipping in propaganda as instructed by those pulling the strings.

But the real gold standard of information laundering is when disinformation sneaks its way into established, trusted media outlets. Journalists, either willingly or under pressure from state proxies, can amplify these narratives.

Some media outlets, those aligned with Beijing for instance, even have in-house polemicists – columnists whose full-time job is to push official narratives.

These voices relentlessly defend China’s human rights record in Xinjiang, attack the West, and promote Beijing’s stance on issues like the South China Sea.

With Singaporeans having one of the highest internet penetration rates in the world, and access to a diverse range of media sources, it’s a given that we are exposed to a wide range of views.

That diversity can be a good thing. But when foreign actors are actively trying to manipulate public opinion to serve their own interests, rather than ours, it has never been more important to be discerning about what we read – and especially what we pass on in closed messaging groups or on social media.

Source: Straits Times © SPH Media Limited. Permission required for reproduction.

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